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A.  Introduction 
 
The doctrine of legitimate expectation was authoritatively accepted as part of South 
African administrative law in the landmark case of Administrator, Transvaal v Traub1 
in 1989.2  In that case Chief Justice Corbett extended the scope of application of the 
rules of natural justice, specifically the audi principle,3 beyond the traditional “lib-
erty, property and existing rights” formula to cases where something less than an 
existing right, a legitimate expectation, required a fair procedure to be followed.4  
This acceptance followed the trend in other Commonwealth jurisdictions to extend 
the application of the rules of natural justice and hence afford greater procedural 
protection to individuals affected by administrative decisions.5  Although Chief 
Justice Corbett expressly stated that the content of the expectation may be substan-
tive or procedural in nature,6 the protection of that expectation, if found to be le-
gitimate, was exclusively procedural.7  Since the Traub decision, the doctrine of 
                                                          
* BA LLB (Stellenbosch) LLM (Virginia), lecturer University of Stellenbosch, gquinot@sun.ac.za. 
1 Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 (A). 
2 For a discussion of this development see CORA HOEXTER, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW VOLUME 2, 209 (2002); G E DEVENISH ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA, 
307 (2001); John Hlophe, Legitimate Expectation and Natural Justice: English, Australian, and South African 
Law, 104 SALJ 165 (1987). 
3 The audi alteram partem principle, which in its most basic form requires the administrator to afford 
affected parties the right to be heard before taking a decision which would adversely affect them. 
4 Traub, supra note 1, at 761 D-G. 
5 Id. 754G – 761D where Corbett CJ examines the development of the doctrine in English law and also 
refers to the acceptance of the doctrine in Australia and New Zealand. 
6 Id. 758D:  The expectation may be that the individual will acquire some substantive benefit, such as a 
license, that is a substantive expectation, or simply that the individual will be heard before a decision is 
taken, that is a procedural expectation.  Corbett CJ also notes that the two forms of expectation may even 
merge, Id. 758E. 
7 Id. 761E, 764A. 
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legitimate expectation has been deeply entrenched in South African administrative 
law to extend the scope of procedural rights afforded individuals affected by ad-
ministrative action.8  It is now an established principle of South African administra-
tive law that a person, who has a legitimate expectation, flowing from an express 
promise by an administrator or a regular administrative practice, has a right to be 
heard before administrative action affecting that expectation is taken.9  The doc-
trine, has however, by and large, remained one that provides procedural protection 
in South Africa.  In a number of recent decisions by South African courts, ranging 
from the High Court to the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court, 
there have been increasing calls for the application of legitimate expectations be-
yond procedural claims.10 
 
In other Commonwealth jurisdictions the doctrine of legitimate expectation has 
been developing beyond the procedural context for a number of years.  The ques-
tion that has been asked in these jurisdictions is whether the existence of a legiti-
mate expectation can give rise to a substantive remedy.  In other words, can a court 
compel an administrator to grant a substantive benefit to an individual based on 
that individual’s legitimate expectation of receiving such benefit?  This application 
of the legitimate expectation doctrine is referred to as substantive legitimate expec-
tation, as opposed to the traditional procedural legitimate expectation.11  The doc-
trine of substantive legitimate expectation has, however, not been universally ac-
cepted in Commonwealth jurisdictions.12 In England, where it has received the 
most attention and acceptance, the position seems to be unclear in the absence of an 
authoritative opinion from the House of Lords.13  
                                                          
8 See Daniel Malan Pretorius, Ten Years After Traub: The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation in South African 
Administrative Law, 117 SALJ 520 (2000); HOEXTER, supra note 2, at 209.  
9 HOEXTER, supra note 2, at 210. 
10 See paragraphs 0 to 0 below. 
11 P.P. CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 611 (1999).  The labels substantive and procedural in this context 
refers to the relief that the legitimate expectation entitles the individual to as opposed to the content of 
the expectation, which, at least in procedural legitimate expectation instances may be either substantive 
or procedural in nature, see note 6. 
12 In Mount Sinai Hospital Center v Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services) (2001) 2 SCR 281 at 
paragraph 35 the minority judgement rejected substantive protection of legitimate expectations in Cana-
dian law. The majority decided the case on different grounds.  See also Reference re Canada Assistance 
Plan (BC) (1991) 83 DLR (4th) 297 (SCC).  In Attorney General, New South Wales v Quin (1990) 93 ALR 1 
(HC) the doctrine was rejected in Australian law, see also Cameron Stewart, Substantive Unfairness: A New 
Species of Abuse of Power?, 28 FED. L. REV. 617 (2000) at 634. 
13 In 1997 the Court of Appeal described the doctrine as “heresy” in R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Ex parte Hargreaves and Others (1997) 1 WLR 906 (CA) at 921.  However, in R v North and 
2004]                                                                                                                                     67 Substantive Legitimate Expectations 
In as well the administrative law of the European Union (“EU”) and many of its 
member states, the protection of legitimate expectations is widely accepted.14  The 
scope of such protection extends significantly beyond that afforded in Common-
wealth jurisdictions and includes substantive protection.  The European Court of 
Justice has at least since the Civil Service Salaries case15 of 1973 applied the principle 
that administrators should be held to their representations.  The jurisprudence of 
the European Union in this context is therefore much more developed than its 
Commonwealth counterparts.   
 
This note examines the recent developments in South African administrative law 
regarding the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation against the backdrop of 
the well developed doctrine in European administrative law.  The analysis of South 
African law shows that substantive legitimate expectation is still in an early stage of 
development.  The note continues to argue that the more developed jurisprudence 
of the European Union holds some important lessons for South African courts in 
developing this doctrine.  A number of considerations are set out in comparison 
and contrast to the European position, which must be kept in mind in the future 
development of the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation in South African 
administrative law.  In closing, the important point is made that South African 
courts will be well-served in not restricting comparative analyses when evaluating 
substantive legitimate expectation claims to English law or the Commonwealth in 
general, from which South African administrative law developed, but to heed the 
lessons from the EU. 
 
B.  European Administrative Law 
 
Legitimate expectations has long been judicially protected by means of review in 
the European Union.  The development of the doctrine in EU law was strongly 
influenced by German law, where expectations created by administrators are given 
strong judicial protection.16  In German law the concept of Vertrauensschutz has long 
                                                                                                                                                     
East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan (1999) LGR 703 the Court of Appeal seems to accept 
the doctrine as part of English law. 
14 See paragraphs 0 to 0 below. 
15 Case 81/72, Re Civil Service Salaries: E.C. Commission v E.C. Council, 1973 E.C.R. 575. 
16 SØREN SCHØNBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 118 (2003); C.f. Forsyth, 
The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate Expectations, 47 CAMB. L. J. 238, 242-244 (1988).  The protection 
of legitimate expectations are in fact still stronger in German law today than is the case in EU law, see, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, ITS MEMBER STATES AND THE UNITED STATES 285 (Rene 
Seerden & Frits Stroink eds., 2002). 
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been recognized as requiring administrators to honor their representations.17  The 
scope of the principle in German law also extends far beyond similar protection in 
Commonwealth jurisdictions to also apply to informal representations and mere 
expectations as opposed to only vested rights.18  As early as 1956 the Oberverwal-
tungsgericht in Berlin applied this principle to hold an administrator to a representa-
tion regarding the payment of a welfare grant.19  As Forsyth20 indicates this decision 
is remarkable in the sense that the court acknowledged that the administrator’s 
representation was clearly unlawful, but still upheld the applicant’s expectation on 
the grounds of her legitimate reliance on the representation. 
 
In EU law the protection of legitimate expectations is, however, not restricted to 
procedural relief, but extend to substantive relief as well.  The general principle is 
that EU institutions will be held to their representations irrespective of whether 
those are procedural or substantive in nature,21 provided that the requirements for 
applying the doctrine are met.  This principle is so well established in EU law that 
legitimate expectations are not classified as either procedural or substantive.22  If an 
expectation is created and that expectation is found to be legitimate the European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ”) will protect that expectation by holding the relevant admin-
istrator to the representation that gave rise to the expectation. 
 
The type of representations creating expectations that has come to be protected by 
the doctrine of legitimate expectation in South African law23 has been protected as 
such in EU law at least since the Châtillon case of 1966.24 
 
                                                          
17 Forsyth, supra note 16, at 242, Seerden & Stroink, supra note 16, at 119, SCHØNBERG, supra note 16, at 
71-72, see also Joined Cases 7/56 and 3-7/57, Algera v Common Assembly, 1957 E.C.R. 39 and Cases 205 
to 215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH et al. v Germany, 1983 E.C.R. 2633. 
18 Forsyth, supra note 16, at 242. 
19 Quoted and discussed by Forsyth, supra note 16, at 243. 
20 Id. 
21 SCHØNBERG, supra note 16, at 117. 
22 P.P. Craig, Substantive Legitimate Expectations in Domestic and Community Law, 55 CAMB. L. J. 289 (1996) 
at 306. 
23 That is informal representations made by administrators such as promises or long-standing practices, 
for example based on an existing policy. 
24 Case 54/65, Châtillon v High Authority, 1966 E.C.R. 185.  It is interesting to note that this case predates 
the English law case of Schmidt v Secretary of State for the Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch. 149, which is 
generally viewed as the case in which Lord Denning created the English law concept of legitimate expec-
tations. 
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The locus classicus in EU law regarding legitimate expectations is, however, the 1973 
case of Re Civil Service Salaries: E.C. Commission v E.C. Council.25  In that case the 
Council departed from an existing published guideline regarding Community staff 
salaries.  Upon review the ECJ ruled that the Council could not depart from its ear-
lier statements without “circumstances sufficient to justify the abandonment.”26  
The court stated the reason for its decision as “the rule of protection of the legiti-
mate confidence which citizens may have in the respect by the authorities of under-
takings of this sort.”27  Consequently the court held the Council to its representa-
tion, that is afforded substantive relief. 
 
In adjudicating legitimate expectation claims the ECJ follows a two step approach.  
Firstly it asks whether the administrator’s actions created a reasonable expectation 
in the mind of the aggrieved party.  If the answer to this question is affirmative, the 
second question is whether that expectation is legitimate.  If the answer to the sec-
ond question is equally affirmative, then the court will hold the administrator to the 
representation, that is enforce the legitimate expectation. 
 
The first step in the analysis has both an objective and a subjective dimension. It is 
firstly asked whether a reasonable expectation of a certain outcome was created.  
The test to determine this reasonableness is what the bonus paterfamilias would ex-
pect.28  The representation itself must be precise and specific29 and importantly, 
lawful.30  The reasonable person would not form a specific expectation on a vague 
representation or rely on unlawful representations.  One important aspect of the 
objective dimension of this inquiry in EU law, is the foreseeability of potential re-
tractions of the representation.31  EU law is quite strict in requiring individuals to 
demonstrate a high degree of diligence in foreseeing that specific representations 
may be retracted or may be subject to constant change and should therefore not be 
                                                          
25 Case 81/72, 1973 E.C.R. 575.  Forsyth, supra note 16, at 242; SCHØNBERG, supra note 16, at 118. 
26 Case 81/72 at 584-5. 
27 Id. at 584. 
28 Case 78/77, Lührs v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, 1978 E.C.R. 169; Case 265/85, Van den Bergh en 
Jurgens v Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 1155; SCHØNBERG, supra note 16, at 119; E. Sharpston, Legitimate 
Expectations and Economic Reality, 1990 ELR 103 at 156.  
29 Case T-123/89, Chomel v Commission, 1990 E.C.R. II-131. 
30 Case 112/77, Töpfer v Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 1019; Case 188/82, Thyssen v Commission, 1983 
E.C.R. 3721, Case 15/85, Consorzio Doopertaive d’Abruzzo v Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 1005, SEERDEN & 
STROINK, supra note 16, at 284. 
31 Case 265/85, Van den Bergh en Jurgens BV and Van Dijk Food Products (Lopik) BV v Commission, 
1987 E.C.R. 1155, Case 52/81, OHG Firma Werner Faust v Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 3745. 
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relied upon.32  This requirement also implies that individuals are required to know 
what the law is and consequently when a representation is lawful or not and hence 
can be relied upon or not.33  The subjective dimension in determining whether a 
reasonable expectation was created is the requirement that the individual must 
subjectively, that is in actual fact, hold the expectation.34  The representations on 
which expectations can be based may take many forms.35  It may be in the form of 
an express statement,36 including general policy statements.37  The expectation may 
also be generated by long-standing practice.38 
 
Once a reasonable expectation exists the administrator is required to act in accor-
dance with that expectation, except if there are public interest considerations which 
outweighs the individual’s expectation.39  Should the individual’s interests out-
weigh the public interest underlying the administrator’s purported action, the rea-
sonable expectation will also be legitimate.40  In such a case there will be a legiti-
mate expectation, which must be respected by the administrator.41  It is the admin-
istrator in the fist instance who strikes the balance between the private and public 
interests and determines whether the expectation should be upheld or disre-
garded.42  The decision of the administrator is however subject to judicial review.  
An individual whose expectation has been disappointed may approach the court to 
review the administrator’s actions and the court will then weigh up the relevant 
                                                          
32 Case T-243/94, British Steel v Commission, 1997 E.C.R. I-1887; Case 78/77, Lührs v Hauptzollamt 
Hamburg-Jonas, 1978 E.C.R. 169; Case 265/85, Van den Bergh en Jurgens v Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 
1155; Joined Cases 424-425/85, Frico v VIV, 1987 E.C.R. 2755; SCHØNBERG, supra note 16, at 127-8; 
SEERDEN & STROINK, supra note 16, at 284. 
33 Case C-80/89, Behn v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe, 1990 E.C.R. I-2659. 
34 SCHØNBERG, supra note 16, at 125. 
35 SCHØNBERG, supra note 16, at 120. 
36 Joined Cases 424-425/85, Frico v VIV, 1987 E.C.R. 2755. 
37 Case 74/74, CNTA v Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 533, Case C-400/92, Germany v Commission, 1994 
E.C.R. I-4701. 
38 Case 344/85, Ferriere San Carlo v Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4435. 
39 Case 120/86, Mulder v Minister van Landbouw en Visserij, 1988 E.C.R. 2321; Case 74/74, CNTA v 
Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 533; Case 96/77, SA Ancienne Maison Marcel Bauche et SARL Francois 
Delquignies v Administration francaise des daouanes, 1978 E.C.R. 383. 
40 Id.; SCHØNBERG, supra note 16, at 128. 
41 SCHØNBERG, supra note 16, at 128. 
42 Id. 
2004]                                                                                                                                     71 Substantive Legitimate Expectations 
public and private interests to determine which trumps which.43  If the court finds 
that the private interest in relying on the representation outweighs the public inter-
est underlying the administrator’s actions, it will declare the expectation to be le-
gitimate and order such expectation to be upheld.44   
 
A good example of this jurisprudence is the Mulder cases.45  In those cases Mulder 
participated in a regulatory measure to curb excess milk production in the EU by 
entering into a five-year-non-marketing period in exchange for a non-marketing 
premium.  At the end of the five year period he applied for a reference quantity to 
resume production under a new levy system, which was introduced since he en-
tered into the non-marketing arrangement.  The application was rejected on the 
grounds that Mulder did not prove his milk production in the preceding reference 
year, which was a requirement for a successful application.  Mulder subsequently 
launched review proceedings claiming that he had a legitimate expectation to re-
sume production after the five year non-marketing period.  The ECJ concluded that 
Mulder had a legitimate expectation to re-enter the market without being specifi-
cally prejudiced due to his participation in the non-marketing arrangement.  The 
court consequently declared the new levy system invalid to the extent that it re-
sulted in no allocation to those producers who participated in the non-marketing 
arrangement.  As a result of the first Mulder case, the Council adopted a regulation 
which allocated a special quota to producers in Mulder’s position in the amount of 
60% of their production in the year preceding the year in which they entered into 
the non-marketing arrangement.  Mulder again brought review proceedings, which 
the court upheld ruling that the 60% quota was too low.  Mulder as a result claimed 
damages.  The ECJ upheld Mulder’s claim to the extent that he was originally de-
nied any quota, but rejected his claim to the extent that he was awarded a 60% 
quota, despite the fact that the latter regulation was also struck down by the court.  
The reason for this difference was due to the fact that in the first instance there were 
no compelling public interests which outweighed Mulder’s expectation, so that his 
legitimate expectation had to be protection.  However, in the latter instance, there 
were important public interests involved in awarding the limited 60% quota, which 
outweighed Mulder’s expectations so that he could not claim damages for loss suf-
fered due to those administrative actions.46   
                                                          
43 Case 120/86, Mulder (I) v Minister van Landbouw, 1988 E.C.R. 2321. 
44 Id. 
45 Case 120/86, Mulder (I) v Minister van Landbouw, 1988 E.C.R. 2321; Joined Cases C-104/89 & 37/90, 
Mulder v Council and Commission, 1992 E.C.R. I-3061. 
46 Joined Cases C-104/89 & 37/90, Mulder v Council and Commission, 1992 E.C.R. I-3061; Sharpston, 
supra note 28; Craig, supra note 22, at 308-309. 
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It is important in the current analysis to note the standard of review which the ECJ 
employs in legitimate expectation cases.  The ECJ will enforce a legitimate expecta-
tion and invalidate administrative action disappointing such expectation where it 
finds a significant imbalance between the private and public interests.47  Although 
it is generally accepted that this standard is more intensive than the traditional 
Wednesbury reasonableness review in English law, applied in similar circum-
stances,48 Schonberg’s analysis of ECJ case law applying the significant imbalance test 
seems to suggest that the ECJ is generally just as deferential to administrative dis-
cretion, especially in matters regarding policy, as its English counterparts.49  How-
ever, Schønberg illustrates that the significant imbalance test is much more “precise, 
structured and coherent” than the traditional approach in English law and should 
therefore be favoured above the English approach.50 
 
Finally, a word needs to be said about the principles underlying the legitimate ex-
pectation doctrine in EU law.  The basic premise underlying the protection of le-
gitimate expectations seems to be the promotion of legal certainty.51  Individuals 
should be able to rely on government actions and policies and shape their lives and 
planning on such representations.  The trust engendered by such reliance is said to 
be central to the concept of the rule of law.52  Forsyth describes the impact of such 
trust and the role the protection of legitimate expectations play in this regard aptly 
as follows:  
Good government depends in large measure on officials being believed by the gov-
erned.  Little could be more corrosive of the public’s fragile trust in government if it 
were clear that public authorities could freely renege on their past undertakings or 
long-established practices.53 
                                                          
47 Case 120/86, Mulder (I) v Minister van Landbouw, 1988 E.C.R. 2321; Joined Cases C-104/89 & 37/90, 
Mulder v Council and Commission, 1992 E.C.R. I-3061, Case C-152/88, Sofrimport SARL v Commission, 
1990 E.C.R. I-2477, Case C-189/89, Spagl v Hauptzollamt Rosenheim, 1990 E.C.R. I-4539; SCHØNBERG, 
supra note 16, at 149-150. 
48 Christopher Forsyth, Wednesbury Protection of Substantive Legitimate Expectations, 1997 PUB. L 375 at 381, 
Paul Craig & Søren Schønberg, Substantive Legitimate Expectations after Coughlan, 2000 PUB. L 684 at 697, 
SCHØNBERG, supra note 16, at 150. 
49 SCHØNBERG, supra note 16, at 150.  His analysis is supported by that of Sharpston, supra note 28. 
50 Id., at 155. 
51 Joined Cases 424-425/85, Frico v VIV, 1987 E.C.R. 2755, SCHØNBERG, supra note 16, at 12; Sharpston, 
supra note 28, at 106; CRAIG, supra note 11, at 611; Forsyth, supra note 48, at 375; CRAIG, supra note 22, at 
299, 304, 311. 
52 SCHØNBERG, supra note 16, at 12-23, Craig & Schønberg, supra note 48, at 685. 
53 Forsyth, supra note 48, at 384. 
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Legal certainty is not, however the only principle at play in legitimate expectation 
doctrine.  The counter value of legality is especially important in the context of the 
substantive protection of legitimate expectations.54  The fear in protecting legitimate 
expectations substantively is that administrators may be forced to act ultra vires.  
That would be the case where an administrator has created an expectation of some 
conduct which is beyond his authority or has become beyond his authority due to a 
change of law or policy.  If the administrator were consequently held to that repre-
sentation he would be forced to act contra legem.  It is clear that such representa-
tions will not be upheld by the ECJ.55  The value of legality in EU law has led to the 
requirement that the expectation must be one of lawful administrative action before 
it can be either reasonable or legitimate.56  Legality therefore seems to take prece-
dence over legal certainty in EU law.  The ECJ will not weigh up the individual’s 
trust in administrative representations against policy considerations to depart from 
that representation if the representation is contra legem.  As stated above, there can 
be no reasonable expectation where the representation is of unlawful conduct and 
hence the question of legitimacy does not arise.57   
 
It is against the background of this well developed doctrine of substantive protec-
tion of legitimate expectations in EU law that the recent South African develop-
ments must be viewed in order to highlight the important lessons that South Afri-
can law can take from the European position.  The South African position is ex-
plored in the following paragraphst. 
 
C.  South African Case Law 
 
As was stated in the introductory paragraph, the doctrine of legitimate expectation 
was imported from English law to South African law in the 1989 case of Administra-
tor Transvaal v Traub .58  In line with English law, at least at that time, the ambit of 
                                                          
54 Joined Cases 205-215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH et al. V Germany, 1983 E.C.R. 2633. 
55 SEERDEN & STROINK, supra note 16, at 284, SCHØNBERG, supra note 16, at 147-148.. 
56 See note 30 supra. 
57 Some member states of the EU, notably Germany and the Netherlands, however, afford greater protec-
tion to the individual in such cases and in fact weigh up the legal certainty interests against legality 
interests when adjudicating substantive legitimate expectation claims.  See Forsyth, supra note 16, at 243 
where he discusses a German case of 1956 in which it was stated that both legal certainty and legality are 
elements of the Rechtstaatprinzip (rule of law) and should consequently be weighed up against each 
other in substantive legitimate expectation claims.  See also Gio ten Berge and Rob Widdershoven, The 
Principle of Legitimate Expectations in Dutch Constitutional and Administrative Law, in NETHERLANDS 
REPORTS TO THE FIFTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 422 (E.H. 
Hondius ed., 1998) and SEERDEN & STROINK, supra note 16, at 170 for a discussion of the Dutch position. 
58 Supra note 1. 
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the doctrine was restricted to procedural protection.  It was incorporated into South 
African law as an extension of the rules of natural justice, that is the procedural 
requirements for fair administrative action.59  Only most recently, has there been 
mention of substantive protection of legitimate expectations in South African law. 
 
The determination of whether a legitimate expectation exists that merits judicial 
protection in South African law is very similar to EU law.  The requirements for the 
existence of such an expectation in South African law were recently restated in Na-
tional Director of Public Prosecutions v Philips.60 These include: (i) that there must be a 
representation which is “clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualifica-
tion”,61 (ii) that the expectation must be reasonable in the sense that a reasonable 
person would act upon it,62 (iii) that the expectation must have been induced by the 
decision-maker and (iv) that it must have been lawful for the decision-maker to 
make such representation.63  If such an expectation exists it will be incumbent on 
the administrator to respect it and afford the individual holding that expectation 
due procedure before the expectation is disappointed.64  Failing such procedure, the 
individual may approach a court to review the administrator’s actions on the 
ground of procedural unfairness.65  If the court finds that a legitimate expectation 
did in fact exist, it will ordinarily invalidate the administrative action and refer the 
matter back to the decision-maker to deal with it in a procedurally fair manner.66 
 
A number of recent South African court decisions, however, have referred to the 
possibility of extending the protection of legitimate expectations to substantive 
relief, that is the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation.  Against the back-
drop of conflicting opinions in the lower courts,67 this question has recently sur-
                                                          
59 HOEXTER, supra note 2, at 209-211. 
60 2002 (4) SA 60 (W) at paragraph 28, quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of Appeal in South 
African Veterinary Council and another v Szymanski 2003 (4) BCLR 378 (SCA) at paragraph 19 and in 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd and another 
[2003] 2 All SA 616 (SCA) at paragraph 65. 
61 Phillips case, supra note 60, at paragraph 28. 
62 President of the Republic of South Africa and others v South African Rugby Football Union and others 
2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at paragraph 216, Szymanski case, supra note 60, at paragraph 21. 
63 Phillips case, supra note 60, at paragraph 28. 
64 Traub case, supra note 1, at 761. 
65 Id. 
66 Pretorius, supra note 8, at 524 to 529. 
67 Compare the High Court judgements in Putco Limited v The Minister of Transport for the RSA and 
others 2003 JDR 0484 (W) (assuming for purposes of the judgement that the doctrine of legitimate expec-
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faced in two judgements by the Supreme Court of Appeal68 and two Constitutional 
Court opinions.69 
  
In both the Supreme Court of Appeal cases the court rejected the claim based on 
substantive legitimate expectation.  It is important to note, however, that although 
the court expressed considerable reluctance in embracing the doctrine, it did not 
reject it and expressly left the door open to an acceptance of the doctrine in South 
African law in future.70  In both cases the court rejected the claim on the grounds 
that no legitimate expectation in fact existed.71   
 
In Meyer v Iscor Pension Fund72 the appellant appealed against an order of the High 
Court setting aside a determination of an adjudicator appointed in terms of the 
Pension Funds Act.  Meyer retired before reaching the normal retirement age and 
as a result received reduced pension benefits in terms of the rules of his employer’s, 
Iscor, pension fund.73  These rules stated that pension benefits will be reduced in 
case of early retirement, calculated with reference to the number of months by 
which actual retirement precedes the normal retirement age.74  Less than two 
months after Meyer’s retirement the rules of the fund was amended as a special 
measure to encourage early retirement, which formed part of rationalisation 
scheme agreed to between Iscor and the trade unions.75  The amended rules re-
moved the penalty imposed on pension benefits in case of early retirement for a 
                                                                                                                                                     
tation forms part of South African law), University of the Western Cape v Member of Executive Commit-
tee for Health and Social Services 1998 (3) SA 124 (C) (stating that it is in the interest of good governance 
that administrators should be held to their promises as long as those are intra vires) and Durban Add-
Ventures Ltd v Premier, KwaZulu-Natal, and Others (No 2) 2001 (1) SA 389 (N) (stating the legitimate 
expectations can only be protected procedurally and not substantively). 
68 Meyer v Iscor Pension Fund 2003 (2) SA 715 (SCA), South African Veterinary Council and another v 
Szymanski 2003 (4) SA 42 (SCA). 
69 Premier, Province of Mpumalanga and another v Executive Committee of the Association of Govern-
ing Bodies of State-Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC), Bel Porto School Govern-
ing Body and others v Premier of the Province, Western Cape and another 2002 (9) BCLR (CC). 
70 Meyer’s case, supra note 68, at paragraph 27. 
71 Meyer’s case, supra note 68, at paragraph 28; Szymanski’s case, supra note 68, at paragraph 16. 
72 Note 68 supra. 
73 Meyer’s case, supra note 68, at paragraph1. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at paragraph 2 and 9. 
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certain group of employees.76  Had Meyer retired two months later, he would have 
received more than twice the benefits he did.77  Meyer subsequently laid a com-
plaint against the fund in terms of the Pension Funds Act and the adjudicator ap-
pointed under the Act determined the dispute in Meyer’s favour.78  The adjudicator 
ordered the fund to pay Meyer increased pension benefits under the amended 
rules.79  The fund succeeded in the High Court to set the adjudicator’s order aside 
upon appeal, but the court allowed Meyer to appeal the judgment.80   
 
One of Meyer’s arguments in the Supreme Court of Appeal was that he had a le-
gitimate expectation that any amendment to the rules, which resulted in increased 
pension benefits as part of the rationalisation scheme, would be implemented with 
retrospective effect.  Had this been done, he would be entitled to increased pension 
benefits.  Meyer based his legitimate expectation on promises made by Iscor in the 
course of the rationalisation program that improved retrenchment benefits would 
be implemented with retrospective effect.81  He did not, however, claim that his 
legitimate expectation entitled him to procedural relief, but that the substantive 
benefit should be afforded to him.82  
 
The court assumed for purposes of the judgment that trustees’ decisions in terms of 
the rules of pension funds can be reviewed on a basis analogous to the review of 
administrative decisions.83  It noted the recent developments in English law accept-
ing substantive legitimate expectations, but also noted the rejection of this doctrine 
in other Commonwealth jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada.84  The court 
expressly refused to either accept or reject the doctrine of substantive legitimate 
expectation in South African law.85  It held that whether to adopt this doctrine or 
not is a “difficult and complex” question and cautioned against simply grafting 
                                                          
76 Id. 
77 Id. at paragraph 3. 
78 Id. at paragraph 5. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at paragraph 25. 
82 Id. at paragraph 26. 
83 Id. at paragraph 22. 
84 Id. at paragraphs 27 and 28. 
85 Id. at paragraph 27. 
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foreign doctrines onto local law.86  The court emphasized the importance of under-
standing the underlying needs that prompted the development of the doctrine in its 
country of origin.87   In this respect the court suggested that the doctrine of substan-
tive legitimate expectation may have developed in English law in response to the 
requirement that valuable consideration be given before an undertaking can be 
legally binding, which requirement is foreign to South African law.88  Despite these 
remarks the court continued to analyze Meyer’s alleged legitimate expectation and 
found that even if the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation were accepted 
as part of South African law, he would still not be entitled to the relief claimed.89 
This conclusion seemed inevitable on the basis that the facts did not support a le-
gitimate expectation.90 
 
The second Supreme Court of Appeal case, South African Veterinary Council v 
Szymanski,91 involved a substantive claim to be registered as a veterinary surgeon.  
As part of a special arrangement in terms of which South African citizens holding 
foreign veterinary degrees could be registered to practice in South Africa, the 
Council conducted a special admissions examination.92 Szymanski wrote this ex-
amination and was awarded a combined mark of 45.25%.  The Council regarded 
this as a failure, taking 50% to be the pass mark and refused to register him.93  
Szymanski subsequently applied to the High Court for an order setting aside the 
Council’s decision that the pass mark was 50% and an order requiring the Council 
to register him as a veterinary surgeon in South Africa.94  He based his claim on a 
legitimate expectation that the pass mark was 40% and not 50%, which expectation 
followed from numerous statements by the Council and its officials.95  The High 
Court ruled in favour of Szymanski setting aside the Council’s decision and order-




89 Id. at paragraph 28. 
90 Id. at paragraphs 29 to 30. 
91 Supra note 68. 
92 Id. at paragraph 2. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at paragraph 3. 
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ing the Council to register him as a veterinary surgeon, that is, the High Court 
granted Szymanski substantive relief based on his legitimate expectation.96 
 
Upon appeal Cameron JA, for a unanimous Supreme Court of Appeal, dealt with 
the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation in a single paragraph.97  He noted 
that the court98 recently cautioned against “an over-hasty” adoption of the doctrine 
in South African law.99  According to the judge, it was, however, not necessary in 
the present case to decide the matter, because “Dr. Szymanski’s case was deficient 
in its most basic essentials.”100  The court continued to show that the applicant did 
not have a legitimate expectation on the facts of the case.101  Resultantly the appeal 
was upheld. 
 
The doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation has also been mooted in the Con-
stitutional Court.  Two judgments are noteworthy in this respect.102  In the first of 
these, the Premier, Province of Mpumalanga case,103 the member of the provincial 
executive council responsible for education104 terminated bursaries paid to certain 
state schools for needy students.105  These bursaries were paid to schools educating 
mainly white students as part of the apartheid education system.106  The MEC’s 
decision to terminate these bursaries formed part of the general transformation of 
the education system.107  About 100 of the schools that previously received such 
bursaries subsequently challenged the MEC’s decision on the grounds that it was 
                                                          
96 Id. at paragraph 14. 
97 Id. at paragraph 15. 
98 Meyer’s case, supra note 68. 
99 Szymanski’s case, supra note 68, at paragraph 15. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at paragraphs 16-21. 
102 Premier, Province of Mpumalanga and another v Executive Committee of the Association of Govern-
ing Bodies of State-Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC) and Bel Porto School Gov-
erning Body and others v Premier of the Province, Western Cape and another 2002 (9) BCLR (CC). 
103 Supra note 102. 
104 The MEC for education. 
105 Premier, Province of Mpumalanga case, supra note 102, at paragraph 2. 
106 Id. at paragraphs 2 and 7. 
107 Id. at paragraph 17. 
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procedurally unfair and unjustifiable.108  The schools applied for an order setting 
aside the decision and an order compelling the MEC to continue to pay the bur-
saries until the end of that school year, that is 1995.109  They based their case on the 
legitimate expectations that bursaries would be paid for 1995 and that they would 
be afforded a fair procedure before the administration terminated the payments.110  
These expectations entitled them to a fair procedure in terms of section 24(b) of the 
Interim Constitution,111 a failure of which would result in the administrative action 
being invalid, so the argument went.112  At paragraph 36 of the judgement, O’Regan 
J stated that it was not necessary in the present instance to decide whether a legiti-
mate expectation may entitle an applicant to substantive relief.  The reason for this 
conclusion is that section 24(b) of the Interim Constitution expressly stated that an 
individual shall have the right to procedurally fair administrative action where his 
or her legitimate expectation is affected.  A claim based on legitimate expectation in 
terms of section 24(b) of the Interim Constitution is therefore clearly restricted to a 
procedural remedy.  In the present case, the court found that the legitimate expecta-
tions of the schools entitled them to a fair procedure before the bursaries were ter-
minated and that no such procedure was followed.113  Consequently, the decision 
was set aside.114  The court, however, refused to sanction the substantive relief or-
dered by the High Court, that is that the bursaries must be paid until the end of the 
school year in line with the applicants’ legitimate expectation.115  O’Regan J con-
cluded that this was not a case in which a court could substitute its own decision 
for that of the administrator.116  However, it was not possible to refer the decision 
back to the MEC to be taken in a procedurally fair manner, seeing that the judge-
ment date was 1998 while the bursaries terminated naturally at the end of 1995.117  
                                                          
108 Id. at paragraph 3. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at paragraphs 31 and 38. 
111 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, act 200 of 1993. 
112Premier, Province of Mpumalanga case, supra note 102, at paragraph 30. 
113 Id. at paragraph 42. 
114 Id. at paragraph 46. 
115 Id. at paragraph 51. 
116 Id.  In common law a court could only substitute its own decision on the merits for that of the admin-
istrator in very narrow circumstances.  These included cases where the end result is a foregone conclu-
sion and referring the matter back to the administrator would only be a waste of resources and cases 
where the administrator exhibited such degree of bias that referring the matter back to him or her would 
result in an injustice, Id. at paragraph 50. 
117 Id. at paragraph 52. 
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The end result of the Constitutional Court’s judgement was therefore that the bur-
saries had to be paid until the end of 1995, that is a result similar to the substantive 
relief granted by the High Court.   
 
The second case in which the Constitutional Court referred to the doctrine of sub-
stantive legitimate expectation is that of Bel Porto Governing Body v Premier of the 
Province, Western Cape.118  In that case the governing bodies of a number of schools 
challenged certain decisions taken by the provincial education department as part 
of a rationalisation scheme.  In order to eradicate inequalities between former 
“whites-only” and “non-white” schools, the provincial department embarked on an 
extensive rationalisation program.  At the same time, the applicants, which were all 
former whites-only schools catering for disabled children, started making requests 
to the department to employ special assistants who were currently employed by the 
schools themselves.119  Upon the department’s refusal to take over these employees 
prior to implementing the rationalisation program, the schools instituted review 
proceedings.  The schools averred that a number of their constitutional rights have 
been infringed by the department’s actions and applied for substantive relief in the 
form of an order enforcing the department to employ the special assistants cur-
rently on the schools’ own pay-roll.   
  
The High Court rejected the application and the schools appealed to the Constitu-
tional Court.  The Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal, but only narrowly on 
a 6-4 split.  Chief Justice Chaskalson wrote the opinion for the majority,120 with 
three dissenting opinions being filed.121  The majority rejected the claim based on 
administrative justice on the ground that a fair procedure was followed vis-à-vis 
the schools and specifically declined to express an opinion on substantive legiti-
mate expectation.122  
 
                                                          
118 Supra note 102. 
119 These schools argued that while they employed their special assistants themselves, the former non-
whites state schools did not have to do so.  The assistants at the latter schools were employed by the 
respective education departments.  The former whites-only schools were finding it increasingly difficult 
to afford their special assistants and therefore appealed to the education department to employ the 
special assistants working at these schools, Id. at paragraphs 11 to 19. 
120 Justices Goldstone, Kriegler, Madlanga, Somyalo and Yacoob concurring. 
121 Justices Mokgora and Sachs filed a joint opinion and justices Madala and Ngcobo each filed their own 
opinions. 
122 Bel Porto School case, supra note 102, at paragraph 96. 
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It is, however, Madala J’s dissenting opinion in the Bel Porto School case,123 which is 
the most relevant for present purposes.  He bases his opinion on a general duty of 
fairness, which rests on the administration.124  From there he continues to discuss 
the doctrine of legitimate expectation and its development in English law and re-
ception in South African law.125  He notes that the doctrine has developed in Eng-
lish law to include substantive protection.126  There is, however, a flaw in his argu-
ment where he jumps from the statement that the doctrine of legitimate expecta-
tion, as it exists in South African law, protects both procedural and substantive 
expectations to the statement that legitimate expectations will be protected substan-
tively in certain instances.127  While the former statement is undoubtedly correct,128 
his second statement does not follow from the first.  As indicated above, the legiti-
mate expectation doctrine was originally restricted to procedural protection.129  
That is, although the content of the expectation could be procedural or substantive 
in nature, the relief afforded was restricted to procedure and specifically the exten-
sion of the audi principle.130  Although the extracts from the Traub case131 quoted by 
Madala J132 support the contention that substantive expectations are protected by 
the doctrine of legitimate expectation, they are no authority for the proposition that 
substantive legitimate expectations will be protected substantively.133  The only 
further authority that Madala J offers for his conclusion that substantive expecta-
                                                          
123 Bel Porto School case, supra note 102, at paragraphs 191 to 218. 
124 Id. at paragraph 207. 
125 Id. at paragraphs 208 to211. 
126 Id. at paragraph 209. 
127 Id. at paragraphs 211 to 213. 
128 As Madala J clearly indicates Corbet CJ already made this clear in the Traub case, supra note 1, which 
originally adopted the legitimate expectation doctrine in South African law. 
129 See paragraphs 0 and 17 above. 
130 See paragraph 1 note 1 above. 
131 Supra note 1. 
132 Bel Porto School case, supra note 102, at paragraphs 210 to 212. 
133 In the Traub case, supra note 1, at 758D-E Corbett CJ concludes with reference to the relevant English 
law: “As these cases and the quoted extracts from the judgments indicate, the legitimate expectation 
doctrine is sometimes expressed in terms of some substantive benefit or advantage or privilege which 
the person concerned could reasonably expect to acquire or retain and which it would be unfair to deny 
such person without prior consultation or a prior hearing; and at other times in terms of a legitimate 
expectation to be accorded a hearing before some decision adverse to the interests of the person con-
cerned is taken.”  It is clear from this extract that although the content of the expectation may be substan-
tive or procedural in nature, the protection afforded remains procedural. 
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tions will be “given substance to” is an article by Professor Robert E Riggs134 in 
which he examines the development of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in 
English law.135  It would therefore seem that Madala J’s casual acceptance of the 
doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation is rather lacking in authority as far as 
South African law is concerned.  This is not to suggest that the doctrine cannot be 
imported into South African law as was originally done with legitimate expectation 
in the Traub case136 and as recently suggested by Brand JA in the case of Meyer v 
Iscor Pension Fund.137  However, any such reception must be done on a careful 
analysis of the relevant foreign developments and an evaluation of the need that 
prompted that development in the foreign jurisdiction(s) and the corresponding 
need in South African law.138 
 
It seems evident from the discussion above that the development of substantive 
legitimate expectation in South African law is still in a very early stage and it is not 
clear whether the doctrine will be accepted at all.  At least Brand JA seemed very 
reluctant in his opinion for the court in Meyer v Iscor Pension Fund139 to accept the 
doctrine.  With the exception of Madala J in the Bel Porto School case,140 all the state-
ments in the higher courts suggest that a much more careful analysis of the relevant 
issues regarding the doctrine must be put before the court before it will be prepared 
to endorse the doctrine.  In such an analysis it will be important to take note of the 
development of legitimate expectation in other jurisdictions.  Since that doctrine 
has always included substantive protection in EU law, the development in that 
jurisdiction is of particular importance.  The next section focuses on some of the 




                                                          
134 Robert E Riggs, Legitimate Expectation and Procedural Fairness in English Law, 37 AM. J. OF COMPARATIVE 
L. 395 (1988). 
135 Bel Porto School case, supra note 102, at paragraph 213. 
136 Note 1 supra. 
137 Note 68 supra.  See the discussion of that case in paragraphs 0 to 0 above. 
138 As was suggested by Brand JA in Meyer v Iscor Pension fund, Id., and as illustrated by Corbet JA in 
the Traub case, note 1 supra, when he accepted the doctrine of legitimate expectation as part of South 
African law. 
139 Supra note 68.  See the discussion of that case in paragraphs 0 to 0 above. 
140 Supra note 102. See the discussion in paragraph 0 above. 
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D.  Comparing EU and South African law 
 
The first important lesson for South African law is the structure of legitimate expec-
tation analysis in EU law.  In EU law there is an added policy analysis, which is 
absent from South African law.  After it has established that there is a reasonable 
expectation, the ECJ weighs the public interest in disappointing that expectation 
against the individual’s interests in relying on the expectation before arriving at the 
conclusion that the expectation is legitimate and should be protected.141  This brings 
the analysis closer to reasonableness review in South African law than the applica-
tion of traditional legitimate expectation doctrine in procedural fairness review.  
Since in procedural fairness cases the matter will ordinarily be referred back to the 
administrator who will revisit the decision in a procedurally fair manner, it has not 
been necessary for the court to investigate the opposing public and private interests 
in the substance of the matter.  That was left to the administrator.  In substantive 
legitimate expectation cases, however, it is the court that will decide on the substan-
tive outcome of the particular administrative action.  It is therefore important for 
the court to keep in mind the relevant substantive interests involved.  When South 
African courts consider substantive legitimate expectation claims, they should thus 
be aware that they are involved in reasonableness review rather than review in 
terms of traditional legitimate expectation doctrine.  
 
The second important point to note, which flows from the first, is the standard of 
review employed by the ECJ.  As noted above, it is only when there is a significant 
imbalance between the public and private interests that the ECJ will interfere and 
afford substantive protection of the legitimate expectation.142  As the EU case law 
suggests, this is a very deferential approach, which allows a large measure of free-
dom to the administration in exercising its discretionary powers.  This is important 
in the current South African context where there is a particular need in allowing the 
government to effect the transformation efforts needed to eradicate the remaining 
injustices of apartheid South Africa.  The discussion of the developing substantive 
legitimate expectation doctrine in South Africa above suggests that such claims 
typically arise in instances where existing policies are changed and replaced by 
various transformation programs.  It is submitted that South African courts should 
be slow in holding back that process by imposing substantive obligations on the 
administration.  At the same time, the value of legal certainty and the accompany-
ing trust in government that infuse the protection of substantive legitimate expecta-
tions is also very important in the current South African climate.  The majority of 
the population has been oppressed by the government for decades and has conse-
                                                          
141 See paragraph 0 above.  
142 See paragraph 0 above. 
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quently lost faith in such structures.  It is therefore important that citizens regain a 
sense of trust in government.  The courts can play a vital role in re-establishing 
such trust by protecting expectations created by organs of state.  Between respect-
ing the transformation process and fostering trust in the legal system, the courts 
must find an appropriate standard of review.  The significant imbalance test of EU 
law, may just be such a standard or at least provide an important starting point in 
developing a South African standard of review in substantive legitimate expecta-
tion cases.  The strict foreseeability requirement in EU law may also be quite help-
ful in this regard.  South African courts may incorporate this requirement to rule 
out claims in transformation type cases on the ground that individuals must foresee 
that old policies and practices, pre-dating democratization, will be changed and 
therefore cannot form any expectation on such policies and practices.  
 
As I have indicated, the principle of legality counters legal certainty in EU law as 
the principles underlying substantive protection of legitimate expectations.143  
South African courts should be likewise mindful of legality as an important value 
in this context.  While legitimate expectations are protected only procedurally, le-
gality is of less concern seeing that the court will only require the administrator to 
observe enhanced procedure when revisiting the invalidated administrative action.  
The court will not order substantive action by the administrator and hence there is 
no fear of the administrator being forced to act ultra vires.  However, this changes 
as soon as legitimate expectations are enforced substantively.  In such a case the 
doctrine may result in administrators being forced to act contra legem.  South Afri-
can courts should therefore consider the effect of any substantive order very care-
fully against the background of legality. 
 
E.  Conclusion 
 
The doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation is only starting to find its way 
into South African law at present.  The courts have suggested that a careful analysis 
of the development of the doctrine in English law is required before it can be ac-
cepted in South African law.144  While this is certainly important seeing that the 
doctrine of legitimate expectation was originally taken from English law into South 
African law, the comparative analysis should not be restricted to English law.  In 
English law the substantive legitimate expectation doctrine is all but settled and 
while the development of the doctrine in that jurisdiction has preceded South Afri-
can law for a considerable period of time, many uncertainties regarding the doc-
trine still remain in English law.145  In contrast, substantive protection of legitimate 
expectations is well established in EU law.  It will therefore be foolish not to pay 
                                                          
143 See paragraph 0 above. 
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close attention to EU law in this regard.  Any comparative analysis clearly shows 
that EU law holds some very important lessons for the development of substantive 










                                                                                                                                                     
144 Brand JA in Meyer v Iscor Pension Fund, supra note 68, at paragraph 27. 
145 Craig & Schønberg, supra note 48, at 701. 
